Published on:

by

An automobile accident occurred and, as a result, the appellee suffered serious injuries. He was taken to a Medical Center where he was evaluated by several physicians, including a surgeon, an orthopedist, and a radiologist. However, these physicians misinterpreted appellee’s x-rays and radiological studies, and negligently concluded that he did not suffer a recent spinal injury, specifically a spinal column injury. Consequently, the attending Bronx surgeon and assistant encouraged appellee to attempt to walk approximately a week after the automobile accident. When he arose from the bed, appellee felt a shock and collapsed. He was then transferred to another Medical Center, a Regional Medical Center (second Medical Center), where he underwent surgery on his spine, but the surgery was not successful in reversing the spinal column damage, the spinal injury. The appellee then retained a lawyer of a certain law firm to investigate and initiate a legal malpractice action against the various physicians. The lawyer considered joining the physicians individually in the malpractice suit but, for various reasons, he decided not to join. He sent an “intent to sue” only to the two Medical Centers and its physicians. However, when the complaint was filed, the first Medical Center was not named. Thereafter, during discovery, the lawyer realized that the second Medical Center’s defense was based upon the comparative fault of the first Medical Center and its physicians. At this point, the statute of limitations had already expired, and the lawyer realized the potential of a legal malpractice claim for failing to join them. Thus, the lawyer then contacted his insurance company and referred the appellee to a new counsel.

The appellee and the second Medical Center, and its physicians, entered into a settlement agreement in the amount of $1,000,000, and then brought a legal malpractice action against the lawyer and his firm, which the Westchester Insurance Company agreed to settle for the policy limits. However, the parties disputed whether the “per claim” amount applied or whether the “aggregate” amount applied. Specifically, the parties disputed whether the attorney’s failure to name the first Medical Center and each individual physician constituted independent wrongful acts or a single claim. So, the appellee filed a declaratory judgment action to determine the issue. He claimed that the policy provided $250,000 per wrongful act with a $500,000 aggregate for multiple wrongful acts. Because the lawyer committed multiple wrongful acts, the appellee claimed that he was entitled to the aggregate limits. The Insurance Company argued that the policy was a claims-made policy and that the policy provided $250,000 per claim rather than per wrongful act; that, since there was only one claim, the appellee was entitled to only $250,000 in coverage. The trial court agreed with the appellee and, on motion for summary judgment, entered a judgment in favor of the appellee for the aggregate limits. Based upon its interpretation of the policy, the trial court found that there were several acts of malpractice during the legal representation of appellees. Thus, the trial ruled that the appellees were entitled to the aggregate policy limits. The Insurance Company now appeals the said judgment.

The issues for the court’s determination is whether or not, pursuant to the insurance policy of the law firm the aggregate policy limit should apply where the appellee’s attorney committed multiple wrongful acts by failing to join several defendants in his medical malpractice action; whether or not, because each of the defendants had separate insurance coverage available to pay a damage award, appellee had multiple claims against his attorney.

Continue reading

Published on:

by

This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiff wife as a result of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on the westbound Long Island Expressway, approximately 500 feet west of South Oyster Bay Road, in the County of Nassau. New York on May 13. 2008. The accident allegedly occurred when the vehicle operated by defendant and owned by the other defendant struck the rear of the vehicle operated by plaintiff husband while it was stopped in traffic. Plaintiff at the time of the accident was a front seat passenger in the vehicle operated by her husband,. By her bill of particulars, plaintiff alleges that she sustained various personal injuries as a result of the subject accident, including straightening of the cervical and lumbar curvature; disc bulges at levels C3 through C6 and level L4-L5; vertebral subluxation complex; and derangement of the left shoulder. Plaintiff alleges that she was confined to her bed and home for approximately two days immediately after the accident. Plaintiff further alleges that she was totally incapacitated from her employment as a registered nurse at the Hospital for approximately three days following the accident and continues to be partially incapacitated from her employment to date.

A Westchester doctor said that, defendants now move for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiffs alleged spinal injuries do not meet the “serious injury” threshold requirement of Insurance Law § 5102(d). In support of the motion, defendants submit a copy of the pleadings, plaintiffs’ deposition transcript, and the sworn medical reports of the doctors. At defendants’ request, a neurologist, a chiropractor, and a physiatrist licensed in medical acupuncture, conducted independent examinations of plaintiff on September 23, 2008. A Lawyer said that, plaintiff opposes the instant motion on the ground that defendants failed to meet their burden of establishing that her injuries do not come within the meaning of the serious injury threshold requirement of Insurance Law § 5102(d). Alternatively, plaintiff asserts that she sustained spinal injuries within the “limitation of use” and the “90/180 days” categories of serious injury as a result of the accident. In opposition to the motion, plaintiff submits her own affidavit, the affidavit of her treating chiropractor, , and the sworn medical reports of her doctors.

The issue in this case is whether plaintiff sustained serious injury as defined under the Insurance Law.

Continue reading

Published on:

by

This appeal from the lower tribunal’s order stemmed from a vehicular collision case. The complainant man stated that he was stopped at a traffic light when a car crash into his vehicle and pushed it into a third vehicle ahead. On impact, he went forward in the seat but was restrained by the seatbelt. He felt his neck snap and had a shooting pain down his arm. The man received medical attention at the emergency room for neck and back discomfort with weakness on his knees. The man was restricted from strenuous physical activity such as lifting. At the time of the incident, the man was only 25 years old.

A chiropractor treated the man six days after the car accident and received complaints of neck pain, headaches, discomfort of the shoulder and upper and lower back, dizziness, fatigue, and nausea. The Queens chiropractor subsequently explained that the man had suffered a permanent injury to the supportive structures of his spine. He also made an initial determination that the impairment was 5 percent, but after reviewing a subsequent myelogram and noting the presence of a lumbar fracture, he explained that the permanency would be significantly greater, 15 percent. While continuing the treatment, the chiropractor referred the man to a neurologist.

The complainant man worked as a technician in aircraft electronics. At about five weeks after the automobile collision, he and a co-worker lifted a 100-pound test station drawer from the floor to a workbench while performing a normal task at work, after which the man noticed back pain and stiffness. After three days of prescribed bed rest and heat packs, he returned to work, but the lifting restrictions were reinstated. Before and after the lifting incident, the man already received treatment from the chiropractor for his low back problems.

Continue reading

Published on:

by

This action was commenced by a man to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident. He alleges that he sustained neck and back injury when the vehicle he was driving, which was stopped for a red light, was struck in the rear by a vehicle driven by a woman. More specifically, the man alleges in his bill of particulars that he suffered spinal injuries as a result of the subject accident. At a deposition conducted, he testified that he is employed as a Bronx laborer for a Brooklyn construction company, and that he missed 11 days of work due to his spine injuries.

The opponent woman moves for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the man is precluded by Insurance Law from recovering for non-economic loss, as he did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law. The woman’s submissions in support of the motion include copies of the pleadings; a transcript of the man’s deposition testimony; medical reports prepared by the complainant man’s treating chiropractor, and his treating neurologist; and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) reports regarding the man’s cervical and lumbar regions prepared in February 2005. Also submitted by the woman in support of the motion is a sworn medical report prepared by the orthopedic surgeon. At the woman’s request, the orthopedic surgeon conducted an examination of the man on June 28, 2006, and reviewed various medical records related to the man’s alleged spinal injuries.

The orthopedic surgeon’s report states that the man presented with complaints of chronic neck and back pain, as well as an occasional limp. The report states, in relevant part, that the man exhibited full range of motion in his cervical and lumbar regions, with no palpable muscle spasm or tightness, during the physical examination. It states that the man stood erect, with no evidence of asymmetry, and that he moved easily during the examination. The report also states that the man demonstrated full range of motion in his upper and lower extremities; that there was no evidence of muscle atrophy or compression neuropathy; and that there was no evidence of any motor or neurological dysfunction. The orthopedic surgeon opines that the man suffered cervical and spine injuries as a result of the accident, and that both conditions have resolved. He further concludes that there was no evidence that the man suffers from any ongoing orthopedic dysfunction or disability.

Continue reading

Published on:

by

A complainant man, age 37, was admitted to a hospital, after having suffered a gunshot wound to his neck. He was treated by a general surgeon and a neurosurgeon. During the first few days of treatment, the Bronx general surgeon formed an opinion that the man would be a permanent paraplegic. The neurosurgeon was also of the opinion that the man’s spinal column had suffered such severe damage and that eventual spasms in his extremities would be inevitable. However, the neurosurgeon noted in the hospital records that the man apparently had a sensation to his feet.

Subsequently, while the man was in an intensive care unit, nurses at the hospital placed him on a special bed used to allow immobilized patients to be rotated to a vertical position. The nurse who was responsible for checking out the bed failed to check on the position of an essential bolt, and as the bed was rotated the man fell. There was conflict in the testimony as to injuries caused by the fall. The man claimed that he struck his back on a chair, while the nurse testified that she caught the man prior to the time he struck to anything. After the incident, the man was examined by another physician, who noted that the patient had not sustained any injury when a section of the bed had almost fallen down. The man testified, however, that his pain intensified after the fall and that it was only after the fall that he had begun to suffer spasms. The man was discharged from the hospital and after which, he was a patient in various other Westchester hospitals. He undergone several operations, but he remains paralyzed.

A pathologist testified as an expert witness for the man. It was his opinion that the fall striking the mid portion of the man’s back in the area through which the bullet had passed had caused some degree of neurological and spinal injury, which in turn caused additional injury to the wound site. Even if the pathologist could not assess any particular degree of aggravation caused to the already existing damage, he did testify that the man’s fall from the bed injured him to some additional degree.

Continue reading

Published on:

by

This action was commenced to recover for personal injuries allegedly sustained by a man as a result of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on or about October 20, 2004. On that date, the complainant man was riding his bicycle when a taxi cab owned and operated by the accused allegedly hit the rear tire of the complainant man’s bicycle.

The Suffolk driver and the taxi company have moved for summary judgment, arguing that the accused man has not met the serious injury threshold as set forth in Insurance Law. In support thereof, the accused driver and taxi company have submitted, among other things, an affirmation of the counsel, the complainant man’s verified bill of particulars, the complainant’s deposition testimony, a report from a radiologist who reviewed an MRI examination of the man, and a report from a neurologist who conducted an independent medical examination of the complainant man.

The complainant man served a verified bill of particulars which alleged that he suffered numerous personal injuries as a result of the. The spine injury claimed by the man was to be of a permanent nature.

Continue reading

Published on:

by

The Bronx complaint of this action sets forth causes of action sounding in medical malpractice, lack of informed consent asserted on behalf of the complainant woman and a derivative claim asserted on behalf of her spouse. It is claimed that the accused parties negligently departed from good and accepted standards of medical/surgical/anesthesia care and treatment when the complainant woman was admitted to the hospital for a scheduled right total hip replacement due to osteoarthritis and lack of blood flow on the right hip, and failed to inform her of the risks and complications associated with the surgery, anesthesia, and treatment with an anti-coagulant drug. It is claimed that due to the negligence of the orthopedic surgeon, the anesthesiologist and the hospital, the woman was caused to suffer extensive bleeding in the area of the lumbar plexus and to sustain serious injury and nerve damage resulting in right lower extremity weakness, foot drop, and numbness due to the failure of the accused parties to properly and timely treat her condition. It is further claimed that the accused doctors and hospital failed to properly provide information concerning the risks, benefits and complications to her to enable her to give an informed consent. The orthopedic surgeon performed the hip replacement, the anesthesiologist administered the spinal anesthesia for the surgery, and postoperative placed a lumbar plexus block and peripheral nerve block.

The moving doctors and hospital seek an order granting summary judgment dismissing the complaint asserted against them on the basis they did not deviate from good and accepted standards of care during the care and treatment and admission of the woman which proximately caused the claimed injuries she suffered.

The accused orthopedic surgeon and anesthesiologist individually submitted their attorney’s affirmation; the affidavit, copies of the summons and complaint, answer, amended answer; the complainants’ verified bill of particulars; and copies of the transcripts of the examinations before trial It is noted that the deposition transcripts of the two doctors are not in admissible form and are not accompanied by an affidavit pursuant to the Civil Practice Laws and Rules, and therefore, are not considered.

Continue reading

Published on:

by

This complaint sets forth a first cause of an action sounding in negligence arising out of the care and treatment rendered to plaintiff wherein she sustained second degree burns to her feet while bathing in a tub on October 10, 2004 while a resident at Siena Village, owned by the a health system of Long Island, Inc. and located at Smithtown, New York. The defendant, was an employee of the facility and the personal care aide for the plaintiff when the spinal injury occurred. The plaintiff resided at Siena Village where she received custodial care and housing. The second cause of action is premised upon the alleged negligent hiring of defendant employee by the defendant health System of Long Island, Inc.

In the answer submitted by defendant employee, a cross-claim has been asserted against the co-defendant health System of Long Island, Inc. for indemnification and/or contribution. In the answer submitted by the health system, a cross-claim has been asserted for judgment over against “Kenneth Doe” who is not named in the complaint, and a second cross-claim for indemnification from defendant employee.

According to the court, the common-law right to indemnification exists pursuant to a contract implied in law and is rooted in equity; it is a device to prevent unjust enrichment. Implied indemnity is frequently employed in favor of one who is vicariously liable for the tort of another, but the principle is not so limited and has been invoked in other contexts as well. Nonetheless, an indemnity cause of action can be sustained only if the third-party plaintiff and the third-party defendant have breached a duty to plaintiff and also if some duty to indemnify exists between them”.

Continue reading

Published on:

by

A Bronx man suffered serious as the result of an automobile accident. He was taken to a Hospital where he was evaluated by several physicians, including a surgeon, an orthopedist, and a radiologist. These physicians misinterpreted the man’s x-rays and radiological studies and negligently concluded that he did not suffer a recent spinal injury. As a result, the attending surgeon and assistant encouraged him man to attempt to walk approximately a week after the accident. When he arose from the bed, he felt a shock and collapsed. He was transferred to a Manhattan Medical Center where he underwent surgery on his spine. However, the surgery was unsuccessful in reversing the spinal column damage.

The man retained a law firm to investigate and initiate a medical malpractice action against the various physicians. Although the man’s counsel considered joining the Hospital physicians individually in the medical malpractice suit, for various reasons he decided not to join them and sent intent to sue only to the Hospital and Medical Center Regional and its physicians. When the complaint was filed, however, the Hospital was not named. During discovery, the man’s counsel realized that the Medical Center Regional’s defense was based upon the comparative fault of the Hospital and its physicians. At this point, the statute of limitations had expired, and the counsel realized the potential of a legal medical malpractice claim for failing to join them. The counsel contacted his insurance company. He also referred the man to a new counsel. The man settled with the Medical Center Regional and its physicians for $1,000,000, and then brought a legal medical malpractice action against his counsel and his firm, which the man’s insurance company agreed to settle for the policy limits. However, the parties disputed whether the “per claim” amount applied or whether the aggregate amount applied. Specifically, the parties disputed whether the attorney’s failure to name the Hospital and each individual physician constituted independent wrongful acts or a single claim.

The man filed a declaratory judgment action to determine the issue. He claimed that the policy provided $250,000 per wrongful act with a $500,000 aggregate for multiple wrongful acts. Because his counsel committed multiple wrongful acts, he claimed that he was entitled to the aggregate limits. The counsel’s insurance company argued that the policy was a claims-made policy and that the policy provided $250,000 per claim rather than per wrongful act. Since there was only one claim, the man was entitled to only $250,000 in coverage. The trial court agreed with the man and on its motion for summary judgment, the court entered a judgment in favor of the man for the aggregate limits. The counsel’s insurance company appeals this judgment.

Continue reading

Published on:

by

The Department of Children and Family Services (DCF) appeals the trial court’s final judgment against DCF finding DCF negligent and awarding the complainants as guardians and adoptive parents of a child, the sum of $26,849,849.06. DCF raises several issues on appeal that the Appellate Court affirms without comment. The Court of Appeals addresses only DCF’s argument that the complainants failed to prove a legitimate case of negligence. It affirmed the final judgment because the complainants presented competent substantial evidence that DCF was negligent and that the negligence was the proximate cause of the spinal injuries sustained by two-year-old child.

The vast majority of the material facts in this case are undisputed. DCF first became involved in this case when representatives at the Miami Children’s Hospital (MCH) called the DCF hotline because the child’s biological mother failed to come to the hospital on December 8, 2000, the date of the child’s discharge. A Suffolk woman, who is the DCF protective investigator assigned to the case, began her formal investigation on December 9, 2000. She testified that she was concerned that the mother did not show up to the hospital on the date of the child’s discharge because she was more interested in getting her boyfriend out of jail, that the mother hardly ever visited or called the hospital while the child was hospitalized for a month, that the hospital had difficulty getting the mother to come to the hospital and sign consents, that when the mother did come to the hospital the child would cry and the mother spanked the child in her hospital bed while the child cried, and that the hospital informed the investigator that the child did not appear very bonded to the mother. In her testimony, the investigator expressed concern because the child’s x-ray results showed a fractured clavicle, for which the mother had no explanation. The investigator also testified that the mother’s boyfriend was living with the mother and the child, and in her training and experience as a DCF protective investigator, boyfriends who live in the home with the child and are not related by blood or marriage to the child are a safety risk to the child because they are not the child’s natural father and have been responsible for abuse situations.

Due to concerns that the mother was not going to be able to provide the necessary follow-up care for her child, the investigator, the mother, and the head of the child advocacy team (CAT) at the hospital met at the hospital on December 11, 2000. The head of CAT testified that clavicle fractures are usually low risk and not of great concern; however, he was concerned because it was an unexplained injury. Although the CAT head testified that he had no recollection or notes of CAT reporting a concern of physical abuse to DCF, he wrote in his CAT consult that the child is a high risk child who should not be released to home until we can more fully insure that the environment is safe and nurturing. The Westchester investigator admitted in her testimony that the CAT head advised her that a home study should be completed first before the child was returned to her home. The investigator also testified that after meeting with the CAT head, she suspected physical abuse.

Continue reading

Contact Information