Car Accident Injury

Published on: June 30, 2024

Delayed aortic transection surgery allegedly led to paraplegia. Lee v. Westchester Cnty. Health Care Corp., 219 A.D.3d 1509 (N.Y. App. Div. 2023)

by Stephen Bilkis

In a case concerning alleged medical malpractice, the Supreme Court of Westchester County ruled on a motion for summary judgment involving issues surrounding the treatment of a patient following a car accident. A motion for summary judgment to dismiss a medical malpractice lawsuit is a legal maneuver where the defendant argues that the plaintiff’s case lacks merit based on undisputed facts and legal principles. It aims to resolve the case without a full trial by demonstrating that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This motion is common in medical malpractice cases because it allows defendants to challenge the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence early in the litigation process, potentially saving time and resources by avoiding a lengthy trial if the court agrees with their arguments.

Background Facts

Following a car accident in the early morning hours of August 19, 2014, the plaintiff was transported to Westchester Medical Center by ambulance. There he was attended to by several medical professionals. The plaintiff was diagnosed with an aortic transection around 2:45 a.m., though he remained hemodynamically stable initially. Due to concerns over potential complications, the attending cardiothoracic surgeon, Dr. Ramin Malekan, delayed surgical intervention until around 5:30 a.m. Subsequently, the plaintiff experienced a critical deterioration in blood flow to his lower extremities, prompting Malekan to proceed with aortic transection repair. Surgery commenced at 9:52 a.m., successfully addressing the aortic injury but resulting in the plaintiff’s permanent paraplegia.

Published on: June 30, 2024

Plaintiff’s lawsuit dismissed; defendant argued lack of serious injury. Peart v. Carreras, 2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 2600 (N.Y. App. Div. 2024)

by Stephen Bilkis

Peart v. Carreras, originating from a motor vehicle collision, focused on the complexities of proving the severity and causation of injuries. As with any personal injury case, the plaintiff must show that the injury suffered was serious. A serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) refers to an injury meeting statutory criteria, such as permanent loss or significant limitation of bodily functions, permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member, significant disfigurement, or a medically determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature.

Background Facts

The lawsuit stemmed from an incident in which the plaintiff claimed to have sustained severe injuries to multiple areas of his body, including the cervical spine, lumbar spine, thoracic spine, left shoulder, and other limbs, following a motor vehicle accident. Central to the defendants’ defense was the presentation of medical reports and expert testimony. Their orthopedic surgery expert’s evaluation indicated normal ranges of motion in the plaintiff’s claimed injury sites, with no signs of tenderness or other abnormalities. Additionally, analysis of the plaintiff’s MRIs suggested no acute injuries to the spinal areas or left shoulder, instead identifying degenerative conditions unrelated to the accident’s impact. Moreover, a biomechanical engineering expert suggested that the low impact of the collision was insufficient to cause the injuries alleged by the plaintiff.

Published on: June 30, 2024

Court assessed whether injuries were serious as required by insurance law. Massillon v. Regalado, 176 A.D.3d 600 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019)

by Stephen Bilkis

A 90/180-day claim typically refers to a type of claim under New York’s No-Fault Insurance Law (Insurance Law § 5102(d)). It involves an assertion by a plaintiff that they suffered a qualifying injury that impaired their ability to perform substantially all of their daily activities for at least 90 out of the 180 days following a motor vehicle accident. This claim is significant because it can affect the determination of whether a plaintiff meets the threshold for “serious injury” under New York law, which is required to bring a lawsuit for damages beyond basic no-fault benefits.

In the case of Massillon v. Regalado, the Supreme Court of Bronx County considered issues related to the 90/180-claim rule as well as whether the plaintiff suffered a serious injury as defined by insurance law.

Background Facts

Published on: June 30, 2024

Plaintiffs claimed serious spinal injuries from motor vehicle accident. Morales v. Calcano, 2020 N.Y. Slip Op. 34615 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020)

by Stephen Bilkis

A common issue when it comes to personal injury cases is whether the injury suffered was a “serious injury.” In Morales v. Calcano, 2020 N.Y. Slip Op. 34615 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020), a motor vehicle accident case, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs did not suffer a “serious injury” as defined by New York Insurance Law § 5102(d).

Background Facts

On April 1, 2016, plaintiffs were involved in a motor vehicle accident. The accident led to injuries for both plaintiffs, who then commenced a personal injury action to recover damages. The defendants, in turn, filed motions for summary judgment, asserting that neither plaintiff sustained a “serious injury” under the law.

Published on: June 30, 2024

In a car accident case, defendants argued plaintiff didn’t meet the serious injury threshold. Martinez v. Hillard, 2022 N.Y. Slip Op. 32204 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2022)

by Stephen Bilkis

When it comes to recovering damages in a personal injury lawsuit, the plaintiff must be able to prove that they suffered serious injuries. In the case of Martinez v. Hillard, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit to recover damages for injuries she allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the plaintiff failed to meet the “serious injury” threshold defined by New York Insurance Law §5102(d).

Background Facts

Manuela Martinez, the plaintiff, was involved in a car accident on July 12, 2019, while traveling on City Island Road near Park Drive in Bronx, New York. She was driving a vehicle that was rear-ended by a bus operated by John A. Santana and owned by Lorinda Enterprises. Martinez claimed she sustained significant injuries to her right shoulder, cervical spine, and lumbar spine due to the accident.

Published on: June 30, 2024

Plaintiff alleged injuries to lumbar spine, cervical spine, left shoulder in car accident. Diarra v. City Bronx Leasing Two Inc., 2021 N.Y. Slip Op. 34011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2021)

by Stephen Bilkis

In the case of Diarra v. City Bronx Leasing Two Inc., the plaintiff, Ibrahima Diarra, alleged injuries from a motor vehicle accident. The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss Diarra’s complaint, arguing that she failed to meet the “serious injury” threshold as defined by New York Insurance Law §5102(d). The plaintiff cross-moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability against the defendants.

Background Facts

Ibrahima Diarra was involved in a motor vehicle accident on August 18, 2018, while traveling southbound on Bronx River Avenue and East 174th Street in Bronx, New York. Diarra’s vehicle was struck from the rear by a vehicle operated by Nelson M. Sanchez. At the time of the accident, Diarra had an automobile insurance policy with Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, which included coverage for bodily injury and Supplementary Uninsured Motorist (SUM) benefits.

Published on: May 7, 2014

Civil Practice Law Rules…cont

by Stephen Bilkis

In support of his motion, the man have submitted an attorney’s affirmation; copies of the pleadings and the woman’s bill of particulars; an uncertified copy of the police car accident report; an unsigned copy of the transcript of the woman’s examination before trial; and the sworn report of an orthopedic doctor concerning his independent orthopedic examination of the woman. Initially, the Court notes that the unsworn police accident report constitutes hearsay and is inadmissible. The unsigned deposition transcript of the woman is not in admissible form and is not considered on the man’s motion nor is the unsigned transcript accompanied by an affidavit pursuant to Civil Practice Law Rules.

Based upon a review of the admissible evidence, the man has failed to establish a legitimate entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

The orthopedic doctor reviewed an MRI of the thoracic spine which indicated that there is a minimal posterior disc herniations causing minimal spinal injury. He also reviewed an MRI of the cervical spine performed on September 5, 2008 which states that the woman experience reversal of the cervical lordosis with multilevel disc bulges and uncovertebral joint hypertrophy, causing spinal and left foraminal stenosis at multiple levels, as well as mild cord compression at several levels as described. While disc herniation and limited range of motion based on objective findings may constitute evidence of serious injury, the orthopedic doctor does not comment on the findings and does not rule out whether the injuries were causally related to the accident.

Published on: May 3, 2014

Civil Practice Law Rules

by Stephen Bilkis

This is a personal injury action allegedly sustained by a woman when she was involved in a motor vehicle accident in New York. A man was the operator of the vehicle when it came into contact with the vehicle operated by the woman.

The woman claims in her bill of particulars that as a result of the within accident she sustained injury and pain in her muscles and her left shoulder; headaches; tightness in the left shoulder to the neck area; limited motion and burning sensation in the left shoulder blade; mid back and neck pain; spine injury; aggravation of reversal of spinal injury with multilevel disc bulges. The accused seeks summary judgment to dismiss the complaint because the woman’s claimed serious injuries fail to meet the threshold imposed by the Insurance Law.

The advocate of a summary judgment motion (judgment without trial) must make a legitimate showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case. To grant summary judgment it must clearly appear that no material and triable issue of fact is presented. The opponent has the initial burden of proving entitlement to summary judgment. Failure to make such a showing requires denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers. Once such proof has been produced, the burden then shifts to the opposing party who, in order to defeat the motion for summary judgment, must proffer evidence in admissible form sufficient to require a trial of any issue of fact and must assemble, lay bare and reveal his proof in order to establish that the matters set forth in his pleadings are real and capable of being established. Summary judgment shall only be granted when there are no issues of material fact and the evidence requires the Court to direct a judgment in favor of the opponent as a matter of law.

Published on: April 29, 2014

On 26 September 2001, an automobile accident occurred involving a woman who was pregnant…cont

by Stephen Bilkis

The Ruling of the Court:

On the Standard of Review:

As the rules provide, the standard of review of an ALJ’s interpretation of the NICA statutory scheme is de novo. The ALJ’s determination with regard to the qualification of the claim for compensability purposes under the statute is conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact. However, an ALJ’s final order is reversible on appeal where its findings of fact are not supported by competent, substantial evidence.

Published on: April 27, 2014

On 26 September 2001, an automobile accident occurred involving a woman who was pregnant

by Stephen Bilkis

The Facts of the Case:

On 26 September 2001, an automobile accident occurred involving a woman who was pregnant. As a result of the injuries sustained, the mother was transported to a nearby hospital where fetal testing was performed. She was then transported to another hospital via helicopter. That same day, after declining into kidney failure, the mother underwent a caesarean section. The condition of the infant at the time of her delivery was a matter of controversy. Although the infant required manual resuscitation, her Apgar scores at birth and within minutes of birth were in the normal range. However, it is undisputed that the infant experienced renal distress as well as spinaldamage. She was placed in the special care nursery.

On 3 October 2001, while still in the special care nursery, the infant experienced pulmonary bleeding and then pulmonary arrest leading to multi-organ failure and seizure activity. She was later diagnosed with a neurological injury, cerebral palsy, although the time the neurological injury or brain injury was sustained remains a matter of controversy. It was only after the October 3 episode that the infant was examined by a pediatric neurologist.