Articles Posted in Long Island

Published on:

This action arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on April 20, 2008. The complainant man’s vehicle was impacted from the rear by the accused man’s vehicle, while both vehicles were moving in the same lane of travel. The accused man’s vehicle was operated by his son at the time of the accident. As a result of the accident, the Long Island complainant claims to have suffered serious and permanent spinal injuries, including restricted range of motion in the areas of his lumbar and cervical spine.

Based upon his bill of particulars, the complainant is asserting claims of permanent consequential and significant limitation of use of a body function or system, and a medically determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature, which prevented him from performing substantially all of his customary daily activities for not less than 90 days during the 180 days immediately following the accident claim.

It is well recognized that summary judgment or judgment without trial is a drastic remedy and as such should only be granted in the limited circumstances where there are no triable issues of fact. Summary judgment should only be granted where the court finds as a matter of law that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. The Court’s analysis of the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the complainant.

Continue reading

Published on:

Defendant moves, pursuant to CPLR § 3212, for an order granting summary judgment due to plaintiff’s failure to meet the threshold limits set by New York State Insurance Law §§ 5102 and 5104. Plaintiff opposes defendant’s motion. A Lawyer said that, the action arises from a motor vehicle accident involving a collision between a motor vehicle operated by plaintiff and a motor vehicle owned and operated by defendant. The accident occurred at approximately 4:00 p.m. on August 21, 2007, on West Merrick Road at its intersection with Rockaway Avenue, Valley Stream, Long Island. On or about May 21, 2008, plaintiff commenced this action by service of a Summons and Verified Complaint. Issue was joined on June 19, 2008.

The issue in this case is whether The Bronx defendant is entitled to his motion for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff did not sustained serious injury as defined under the Insurance law.

The Court held that, it is well settled that the proponent of a motion for summary judgment must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by providing sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of material issues of fact. To obtain summary judgment, the moving party must establish its claim or defense by tendering sufficient evidentiary proof, in admissible form, sufficient to warrant the court, as a matter of law, to direct judgment in the movant’s favor. Such evidence may include deposition transcripts, as well as other proof annexed to an attorney’s affirmation. If a sufficient prima facie showing is demonstrated, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to come forward with competent evidence to demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact, the existence of which necessarily precludes the granting of summary judgment and necessitates a trial. When considering a motion for summary judgment, the function of the court is not to resolve issues but rather to determine if any such material issues of fact exist.

Continue reading

Published on:

A man working as a millwright for a saw mill in Florida had been working at the same saw mill for the past twenty-four years. His job required him to do heavy manual labor consisting of bending from the waist to lift heavy objects and carrying the heavy objects. As time went on, the millwright gradually experienced pain in his right leg and hip. There was no specific incident that caused any spinal injury to the millwright during the course of his employment. The pain soon interfered with his duties at the saw mill and this prompted him to consult an orthopedic surgeon who immediately placed him on no-work status and referred him to a neurologist for testing.

The Long Island neurologist ran medical tests and scans on the man’s spine. The tests showed that the man had stenosis or a narrowing or choking of the spinal nerve roots in his neck and lower back. The compression of the spinal nerve roots cause the shooting pain in his hip and right leg. Spinal stenosis is a degenerative disease that occurs from repetitive bending and lifting of heavy objects.

The neurologist and the orthopedic surgeon both found that the man suffered from a degenerative disk disease and L3-4 herniated disk. They advised the millwright to take medication, sufficient rest and physical therapy to stop the pain and to arrest the further damage to his spine. The employer refused to pay the millwright’s claim for compensation and filed a complaint with the Compensation Commission.

Continue reading

Published on:

The Manhattan plaintiff alleges that on or about November 29, 2001 through December 13, 2001 he came under the medical care and treatment of MD, a physician specializing in the field of transplant surgery. On or about May 2001 through June 13, 2002, the plaintiff came under the care of MD2., a physician specializing in the field of internal medicine. He also came under the care of the defendant MD3, M.D. who holds himself out as a Long Island physician specializing in surgery. From about November 28, 2001 through December 13, 2001, the plaintiff came under the care of a Memorial Hospital located in Rochester, New York where he had his kidney donor surgery performed. The plaintiff claims, inter alia, that the defendants were negligent in his care and treatment in failing to properly perform a laparoscopic donor nephrectomy; prematurely discharging him after the surgery with a retroperitoneal hematoma; causing the pancreas injury and failure; causing an inflammatory nidus and pancreatic pseudocyst; in causing a pancreaticocolenic fistula; causing the plaintiff to undergo exploratory laporatomy and drainage of a large intra abdominal abscess and closure of a colonic fistula, and causing the plaintiff to undergo a colosotomy and colostomy take-down surgical procedure to the pancreas.

MD2 seeks an order granting summary judgment dismissing the complaint asserted against him on the basis that he did not depart from good and accepted medical practice during his care and treatment of the plaintiff and that the action is time barred as although the plaintiff saw MD2 on four occasions following his surgery, all MD2 did was order laboratory tests and CT scans and then refer the plaintiff for surgical management. MD2 claims his last involvement with the plaintiff was on January 2002 and the action was not commenced until September 2004.

MD3, who is represented by the same attorneys as MD2 seeks summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the basis that there were no departures by him that proximately caused the plaintiffs spinal injuries.

Continue reading

Published on:

This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff in a motor vehicle accident on June 24, 2006 at approximately 8:45 a.m. The accident occurred at Hill Avenue at its intersection with Hempstead Turnpike, Hempstead, New York. Plaintiff alleges that he was stopped at a red light when the vehicle owned and operated by defendant rear-ended plaintiff’s vehicle. The police accident report states that “motor vehicle #1 in collision with motor vehicle #2.”

In his bill of particulars, a Lawyer said that plaintiff alleges that he sustained the following injuries: subligamentous central posterior disc herniation at C4-5, subligamentous central posterior disc hernation at C5-6, impinging on the anterior aspect of the spinal canal posterior lumbar herniation at L4-5, and straightening of the lumbar curvature.

A Long Island doctor said that, defendant moves for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the grounds that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury as defined by Insurance Law § 5102(d). In support thereof, defendant relies uponplaintiff’s deposition testimony and an affirmed medical report of the doctor. At his examination-before-trial, plaintiff testified to his inability to perform activities due to his injuries sustained in the accident. Specifically, plaintiff was physically restricted and not able to swim, mountain bike and exercise.

Continue reading

Published on:

This complaint sets forth a first cause of an action sounding in negligence arising out of the care and treatment rendered to plaintiff wherein she sustained second degree burns to her feet while bathing in a tub on October 10, 2004 while a resident at Siena Village, owned by the a health system of Long Island, Inc. and located at Smithtown, New York. The defendant, was an employee of the facility and the personal care aide for the plaintiff when the spinal injury occurred. The plaintiff resided at Siena Village where she received custodial care and housing. The second cause of action is premised upon the alleged negligent hiring of defendant employee by the defendant health System of Long Island, Inc.

In the answer submitted by defendant employee, a cross-claim has been asserted against the co-defendant health System of Long Island, Inc. for indemnification and/or contribution. In the answer submitted by the health system, a cross-claim has been asserted for judgment over against “Kenneth Doe” who is not named in the complaint, and a second cross-claim for indemnification from defendant employee.

According to the court, the common-law right to indemnification exists pursuant to a contract implied in law and is rooted in equity; it is a device to prevent unjust enrichment. Implied indemnity is frequently employed in favor of one who is vicariously liable for the tort of another, but the principle is not so limited and has been invoked in other contexts as well. Nonetheless, an indemnity cause of action can be sustained only if the third-party plaintiff and the third-party defendant have breached a duty to plaintiff and also if some duty to indemnify exists between them”.

Continue reading

Published on:

This is an action to recover damages for serious personal injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiff as a result of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on Route 109 at or near the overpass of the Southern State Parkway, County of Suffolk, New York on March 9, 2005. Plaintiff claims in his complaint that he sustained serious permanent injuries as defined in Section 5102 (d) of the Insurance Law and economic loss greater than basic economic loss, as defined in Section 5102 (a) of the Insurance Law. A Suffolk Personal Injury Lawyer said that, defendants now move for an order pursuant to CPLR 3212 granting them summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the grounds that plaintiff did not sustain a “serious injury” as defined in Insurance Law § 5102 (d). Plaintiff cross moves for partial summary judgment on liability grounds and for an inquest as to the assessment of damages. Plaintiff opposes defendants’ motion, and defendants have filed a reply.

A Lawyer said that, in support of this motion defendants submit, the pleadings; the plaintiff’s verified bill of particulars; plaintiff’s Hospital emergency department records, including x-ray reports of plaintiff’s cervical and thoracic spine; the affirmed report of defendant’s examining neurologist,; the affirmed report of defendant’s examining radiologist,; the affirmed report of defendant’s examining orthopedist,; plaintiff’s employment verification records dated March 1, 2006; and plaintiff’s deposition testimony.

A Long Island doctor said that, plaintiff claims in his verified bill of particulars that he sustained, among other things, disc bulges of the cervical spine injury and ventral cord abutment; a limited range of motion of the cervical spine injury; weakness in the upper extremities; and lumbar radicular dysfunction. Plaintiff also claims that he sustained scarring, anxiety and mental suffering. Additionally, plaintiff claims that he was totally disabled for about three weeks and that he remains partially disabled to date. Lastly, plaintiff claims that he sustained a serious injury in the categories of a permanent loss of use, a permanent consequential limitation, a significant limitation and a non-permanent injury.

Continue reading

Published on:

The Long Island complainant man went to the emergency room of a hospital complaining of weakness in his lower extremities and severe lower back pain. He had gone to the emergency room five days earlier complaining of left hip and back pain, and was sent home with pain medication. The pain persisted, and he began experiencing weakness in his legs, twice falling or nearly falling when his legs buckled. He was able to walk, though with difficulty. During his emergency room visit, radiographic tests, including a myelogram, were ordered, and the man was admitted to the hospital.

On the morning of 25 June 1994, the accused Manhattan anesthesiologist explained to the complainant man that he would need to administer a caudal block rather than general anesthesia for the myelogram because the man needed to be awake during the test. The radiologist performed the myelogram around 3:00 p.m. that day. The next morning, the man discovered he felt no pain, was numb from his hips down, and could not move his legs. The anesthesiologist and the nursing staff blamed the numbness and inability to move on the anesthesia, telling the man it had not yet worn off. The man thought this was strange because, in his experience, it usually took only four to five hours for the effects of anesthesia to wear off. He thought either something had gone wrong or his condition was worse than the doctors originally thought.

The myelogram revealed massive disc herniation causing spinal injury, and the accused man’s attending physician and neurologist advised the man that he urgently needed surgery. The neurologist performed a laminectomy and discectomy. However, the man remained paralyzed following the surgery.

Continue reading

Published on:

This involves a case where the court denied the petition stating that petitioner was not eligible for an RSSL Sec. 607-b pension when she applied for pension for benefits.

Petitioner began working as an EmergencyMedical Technician (EMT) with the FDNY in 1992. She is a Tier 4 Member of NYCERS pension fund. In 1995, petitioner was involved in a line of duty ambulance accident, sustaining spinal injuries. As a result, petitioner was out of work on paid sick leave for approximately 18 months. When she returned to work, it was determined that she could no longer work on an ambulance because of her injuries. She was assigned to work as a dispatcher. Over time, her condition worsened and she developed severe pain and locking of her hands. Petitioner, on May 10, 2006, was diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, disc herniations at C5-6 and L5-S1, left radiculopathy, tendinitis, fluid in the distal ulnar joint and bi-lateral ulnar neuropathy. Accordingly, on that day, petitioner stopped working for medical reasons and remained on an unpaid medical leave of absence. Then, on August 10, 2006 and September 28, 2006, petitioner underwent carpal tunnel release surgeries.

FDNY, by letter dated July 30, 2008, advised petitioner CARTER that because she had been absent and unable to perform her job since April 2, 2007, her employment was subject to be terminated on August 11, 2008.

Continue reading

Published on:

The Hudson Bridge in New York was being repaired. The Bridge and Tunnel Authority, the owner of the Hudson Bridge hired a general contractor to do the repairs. The general contractor hired a subcontractor. Under the subcontract, the subcontractor was supposed to obtain insurance in behalf of the bridge owner and the general contractor. The insurance policy of the subcontractor was supposed to cover all expenses for personal injury suits that may arise from the time that the subcontractor was doing repair work under the subcontract.

On August 11, 2003, a male employee of the subcontractor slipped and fell on a makeshift inclined ramp that led from the worksite to the temporary office also at the construction site. The employee of the subcontractor sustained serious spinal injury. His slip and fall resulted in herniated discs of his cervical and lumbar spine and an impinged nerve on the spine. The employee was confined to his home for one month after the accident. He was ordered to rest in bed for five months from September 2004 until February 2004. The employee needed spinal fusion surgery to fully recover from his injuries.

He filed a damage suit under common law negligence and under labor law. He sued the owner of the Hudson Bridge and the general contractor. The man did not include in his damage suit his own employer, the subcontractor. The man claimed for lost earnings and for future loss of earnings due to the spinal injury he sustained. No notice was given by any of the parties to the insurer of the subcontractor until two years had passed from the time that the suit was filed by the employee of the subcontractor.

Continue reading

Contact Information